six neighborhood factors that affect the environmental performance of buildings, including historic ones

The Greenest Building Is The One That's Already Built … Sometimes    Posted June 20, 2011 by Kaid Benfield

copied from: http://sustainablecitiescollective.com/kaidbenfield/26182/greenest-historic-building-one-thats-right-context?utm_source=scc_newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter

I'm in Wilmington, Delaware this week, where I was asked (and honored) to speak to an EPA-sponsored symposium on green historic preservation.  I spoke yesterday afternoon, and this is what I said.

 

I started with the wonderful phrase attributed to Carl Elefante, "the greenest building is the one that is already built."  (Carl, whom I just met, is also speaking at the conference, so I hope I got it right.)  There is much truth in that statement, since a new building, no matter how green its technology, will often be on a new site, sometimes in sprawl; it will also need to use new material and energy that have already been invested in an older building; and chances are the new building will lack some of the traditional green wisdom that, over the centuries, informed building performance and efficiency "before the thermostat age," as Steve Mouzon (another conference speaker) puts it.

That said, though, the greenest building will not be the one that's already built if it has been abandoned, and rendered nonfunctional and deteriorating because its community or neighborhood has been disinvested by the flight of people and economic resources to the fringe of the region.  I have long thought that the greatest contribution that the National Trust's visionary former president, Dick Moe, made to the cause was to understand that sprawl is antithetical to saving older communities, neighborhoods, and buildings.  He believed it was in the interest of preservationists to fight sprawl and support revitalization, and I do, too.

 

Of course, disinvestment and sprawl are not just preservation issues.  If you care about green preservation, you also have to take into account that households in centrally located properties and neighborhoods use far less energy and emit far less carbon for transportation than their counterparts in sprawl.  And you have to take into account that, for many households and office buildings, carbon emissions from transportation exceed those emitted by operation of the building.  The poorly planned spread of development that characterized so much of the late 20th century also eats up culturally and environmentally significant landscapes, farmland, habit, and watersheds.

These are regional issues, not just building-centric issues, and I believe that green preservation means, among other things, thinking about how we want our metro areas to be shaped as we go into the future.  Will our development patterns be supportive of older communities and neighborhoods?  Green preservation requires it.

In addition to the serious problems that accompany abandonment and are properly addressed at the regional scale, preservationists who care about green performance must also care about the neighborhoods that surround the properties we wish to preserve.  If a historic building, even a functioning one, is not within a strong, supportive neighborhood context, it will not perform well environmentally.  These issues are in some ways analogous to those that concern the larger region, but they are less about broad policy objectives and more about the character of the immediate, close-at-hand environment.

 

I only had 30 minutes, so I didn't go into as much wonky detail as I would have enjoyed (!), but I emphasized six neighborhood factors that affect the environmental performance of buildings, including historic ones.  These are all backed by research:

• Location.  The centers of regions and older suburbs perform better than the fringe, even if other factors are held constant.
• Connected streets.  A well-connected street network (featuring smaller blocks and lots of intersections) shortens travel distances and makes walking more feasible and pleasant.  It is the single most important determinant of how much walking will take place in a neighborhood and the second most important determinant (after location) of how much driving will take place.
• Places to go.  A mix of conveniences such as shops, schools, and places to eat and socialize encourages walking, promotes fitness and health, and reduces emissions from driving.
• Ways to get around.  The more transportation choices, the better.  If you're lucky enough to be within walking distance of rail transit, for example, the number of automobile trips during rush hours can be up to 50 percent lower than what would otherwise be expected under standard engineering forecasts.
• Density.  As I have said before, it doesn't necessarily have to be high density to reduce driving and watershed-damaging pavement per household.  We see substantial improvements in performance as we move from large-lot sprawl even to ten homes per acre; beyond 40 to 50 homes per acre, we continue to see improvements, but at reduced increments.  Moderate density helps a lot.
• Green stormwater infrastructure.  While runoff per household goes down in denser neighborhoods, runoff per acre can go up unless mitigated.  Green infrastructure, when in the form of publically accessible green spaces, can also bring an array of additional benefits to a neighborhood.

One could go on with additional factors, but in the interest of time I stopped there.  I believe that green preservation must include strengthening the neighborhood environment around what we want to preserve.  Maybe we can't do all of these things in every place, but we can do (or support others who can do) at least some of them in many places.

I then turned to a delicate issue:  both environmentalists and preservationists need to protect our credibility.  We have created a system of safeguards and laws that are entirely appropriate but also can be misused, even by those who do not have our interests at heart.  Every puddle is not an ecologically significant ecosystem, particularly if what can replace it is a building or development with great green infrastructure that can also add density and strengthen the environmental performance of the neighborhood.  Every vacant lot isn't well-suited to be a park or garden (some are).  I believe environmentalists need to speak up when our cause is invoked to block something that actually would be environmentally beneficial, just as we need to speak up when something would truly harm the environment.

Preservationists face a similar situation:  every building that is 50 years old is not worthy of protection.  Within walking distance of my house, some people tried to block a great development (see rendering) by asserting that the ugly, plain, dysfunctional supermarket on the site was historically significant.  They didn't care about the building at all.  They wanted it replaced, actually, just not with what was proposed.  So they played the historic preservation card, in my opinion damaging the reputation of a movement that needs to be taken seriously when the property in question is truly worthy.  (Their petition was eventually withdrawn.)

In other words:  green preservation also means being discerning in asserting our cause and vigilant against those who hurt us by abusing it.

I'm sure some conference participants were surprised and perhaps even disappointed that I didn't talk much about individual building performance.  Instead, I tried to talk about the context of green preservation more than about preservation per se.  Because I think the context matters, both to preservation and to the planet.

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*Scott's Contracting*

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Transocean releases internal investigation into the Deepwater Horizon accident

June 22, 2011

Source: Transocean

Transocean Ltd. (NYSE: RIG) (SIX: RIGN) released an internal investigation report on the causes of the April 20, 2010, Macondo well incident in the Gulf of Mexico.

Following the incident, Transocean commissioned an internal investigation team comprised of experts from relevant technical fields and specialists in accident investigation to gather, review, and analyze the facts and information surrounding the incident to determine its causes.

The report concludes that the Macondo incident was the result of a succession of interrelated well design, construction, and temporary abandonment decisions that compromised the integrity of the well and compounded the likelihood of its failure. The decisions, many made by the operator, BP, in the two weeks leading up to the incident, were driven by BP's knowledge that the geological window for safe drilling was becoming increasingly narrow. Specifically, BP was concerned that downhole pressure -- whether exerted by heavy drilling mud used to maintain well control or by pumping cement to seal the well -- would exceed the fracture gradient and result in fluid losses to the formation, thus costing money and jeopardizing future production of oil.

The Transocean investigation team traced the causes of the Macondo incident to four overarching issues:

Risk Management and Communication: Evidence indicates that BP failed to properly assess, manage and communicate risk to its contractors. For example, it did not properly communicate to the drill crew the absence of adequate testing on the cement or the uncertainty surrounding critical tests and procedures used to confirm the integrity of the barriers intended to inhibit the flow of hydrocarbons into the well. It is the view of the investigation team that the actions of the drill crew on April 20, 2010, reflected the crew's understanding that the well had been properly cemented and successfully tested.

Well Design and Construction: The precipitating cause of the Macondo incident was the failure of the downhole cement to isolate the reservoir, which allowed hydrocarbons to enter the wellbore. Without the failure of the cement barrier, hydrocarbons would not have entered the well or reached the rig. While drilling the Macondo well, BP experienced both lost circulation events and kicks and stopped short of the well's planned total depth because of an increasingly narrow window for safe drilling, specifically a limited margin between the pore pressure and fracture gradients. In the context of these delicate conditions, cementing a long-string casing would increase the risk of exceeding the margin for safe drilling. But rather than adjusting the production casing design to avoid this risk, BP adopted a technically complex nitrogen foam cement program that allowed it to retain its original casing design. The resulting cement program was of minimal quantity, left little margin for error, and was not tested adequately before or after the cementing operation. Further, the integrity of the cement may have been compromised by contamination, instability and an inadequate number of devices used to center the casing in the wellbore.

Risk Assessment and Process Safety: Based on the evidence, the investigation team determined that BP failed to properly require or confirm critical cement tests or conduct adequate risk assessments during various operations at Macondo. Halliburton and BP did not adequately test the cement slurry program, despite the inherent complexity, difficulties and risks associated with the design and implementation of the program and some test data showing that the cement would not be stable. BP also failed to assess the risk of the temporary abandonment procedure used at Macondo, generating at least five different temporary abandonment plans for the Macondo well between April 12, 2010 and April 20, 2010. After this series of last-minute alterations, BP proceeded with a temporary abandonment plan that created unnecessary risk and did not have the required approval by the MMS. Most significantly, the final plan called for underbalancing the well before conducting a negative pressure test to verify the integrity of the downhole cement or setting a cement plug to act as an additional barrier to flow. It does not appear that BP used risk assessment procedures or prepared Management of Change documents for these decisions or otherwise addressed these risks and the potential adverse effects on personnel and process safety.

Operations:

Negative Pressure Test: The results of the critical negative pressure test were misinterpreted. Post-incident investigation determined that the negative test was inadequately set up because of displacement calculation errors, a lack of adequate fluid volume monitoring, and a lack of management of change discipline when the well monitoring arrangements were switched during the test. It is now apparent that the negative pressure test results should not have been approved, but no one involved in the negative pressure test recognized the errors. BP approved the negative pressure test results and decided to move forward with temporary abandonment. The well became underbalanced during the final displacement, and hydrocarbons began entering the wellbore through the faulty cement barrier and a float collar that likely failed to convert. None of the individuals monitoring the well, including the Transocean drill crew, initially detected the influx.

Well Control: With the benefit of hindsight and a thorough analysis of the data available to the investigation team, several indications of an influx during final displacement operations can be identified. Given the death of the members of the drill crew and the loss of the rig and its monitoring systems, it is not known which information the drill crew was monitoring or why the drill crew did not detect a pressure anomaly until approximately 9:30 p.m. on April 20, 2010. At 9:30 p.m., the drill crew acted to evaluate an anomaly. Upon detecting an influx of hydrocarbon by use of the trip tank, the drill crew undertook well-control activities that were consistent with their training including the activation of various components of the BOP. By the time actions were taken, hydrocarbons had risen above the blowout preventer and into the riser, resulting in a massive release of gas and other fluids that overwhelmed the mud gas separator system and released high volumes of gas onto the aft deck of the rig. The resulting ignition of this gas cloud was inevitable.

Blowout Preventer (BOP): Forensic evidence from independent post-incident testing by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and evaluation by the Transocean investigation team confirm that the Deepwater Horizon BOP was properly maintained and operated. However, it was overcome by the extreme dynamic flow, the force of which pushed the drill pipe upward, washed or eroded the drill pipe and other rubber and metal elements, and forced the drill pipe to bow within the BOP. This prevented the BOP from completely shearing the drill pipe and sealing the well.

Alarms, Muster, and Evacuation: In the explosions and fire, the general alarm was activated, and appropriate emergency actions were taken by the Deepwater Horizon marine crew. The 115 personnel who survived the initial blast mustered and evacuated the rig to the offshore supply vessel Damon B. Bankston.

The Transocean internal investigation team began its work in the days immediately following the incident. Through an extensive investigation, the team interviewed witnesses, reviewed available information regarding well design and execution, examined well monitoring data that had been transmitted real-time from the rig to BP, consulted industry and technical experts, and evaluated available physical evidence and third-party testing reports.

The loss of evidence with the rig and the unavailability of certain witnesses limited the investigation and analysis in some areas. The team used its cumulative years of experience but did not speculate in the absence of evidence. The report of the team does not represent the legal position of Transocean, nor does it attempt to assign legal responsibility or fault.

Transocean's internal investigation into the accident can be found here: Macondo Well Incident Report.

Transocean releases internal investigation into the Deepwater Horizon accident

Spray Foam Insulation Estimating Tips

While Working on an Material Estimate for Installing 10 Replacement Windows.  I wanted to share this Information on from Dow Great Stuff.

Sizes and Estimated Yields for GREAT STUFF PRO™ Window & Door Insulating Foam Sealant
Can Size, oz (g)	Delivery	No. of Windows(1)
20 (567)	Reusable Straw	6-9
20 (567)	Gun	8-11
24.5 (695)	Reusable Straw	8-11
24.5 (695)	Gun	11-14

⁽¹⁾ Average-sized windows (36" x 60" [0.9 m x 1.5 m), gap 3/8" [10 mm] wide and 1" [25 mm] deep)

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*Scott's Contracting*

Green Me UP-Scotty
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Energy Plan Live-Chat-Sen Lugar’s Sen Adviser N Brown on Facebook

	First for Facebook, First for Energy
	Jun 22, 2011	Office of Senator Dick Lugar
	On Wednesday, June 22, 2010, we are extremely excited about a first for the Senate and a first for Facebook – the start of a rollout of legislation exclusively via Facebook. Beginning at 6:30 p.m. (Eastern) tomorrow we'll host a Practical Energy Plan Live-Chat with Senator Lugar's Senior Adviser Neil Brown on Facebook. This is an exciting piece of Dick Lugar's introduction of his Practical Energy Plan on Facebook. Folks will be able to comment on the live-stream and Neil Brown will answer questions regarding Senator Lugar's upcoming legislation. As Hoosiers continue to integrate new media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter into their lives, Senator Lugar is connecting more Hoosiers directly with the legislative process. In the next week, Senator Lugar will continue to engage his Facebook and Twitter followers in polls, questions, and notes regarding this legislation. In an intimate press conference next week, Senator Lugar will introduce the legislation and live-stream the moment solely to his Facebook friends. To participate in this 'first-of-its-kind' event, you must "like" Senator Lugar's Facebook page at www.facebook.com/senatorlugar and watch for the link for our live stream beginning at 6:30 p.m. Eastern.

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*Scott's Contracting*

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Reducing the Need to Build NEW Power Plants

report says EERS policies are driving energy efficiency investments and energy cost savings to unprecedented levels national energy policy remains beyond the reach of Congress ((13 of the 19 states are achieving 100% or more of their goals)) U.S. states lead on energy efficiency, lower utility bills
	Jun 20, 2011	USA Today
	As Congress remains in gridlock, U.S. states are taking the lead in energy efficiency. New research shows 26 now have rules that are lowering utility bills for consumers and reducing the need to build new power plants. From 2004 to 2010, 24 states followed the lead of Texas and Vermont in adopting an Energy Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS), which require utilities to save a certain amount of power each year, according to the first progress report of states that have had such rules for at least two years. The policies require that the savings outweigh the costs. "These states are demonstrating that energy efficiency programs deliver real savings for utilities and ratepayers, and it is more affordable than any supply-side energy source," said report author Michael Sciortino of the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, a Washington-based research group. The report says EERS policies are driving energy efficiency investments and energy cost savings to unprecedented levels. For example, in 2009 and 2010, it says Ohio utility customers saved $56 million in energy costs over and above the costs to deliver the programs. "As a comprehensive national energy policy remains beyond the reach of Congress, states are taking action to show how bold energy efficiency policies can benefit residential, commercial, and industrial consumers," said Steven Nadel, the group's executive director, in a statement. The report found that 13 of the 19 states are achieving 100% or more of their goals, three states are reaching more than 90%, and the three states falling below 80% are working hard to catch up. It espects more savings from state EERS, since most targets increase over the next decade. Nadel's group also released a second report analyzing the efforts of six states with some of the largest and most successful energy efficiency programs in the United States: California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York and Vermont. It also looks at the efforts of six other states with simpler but cost-effective efforts: Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

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*Scott's Contracting*

Green Me UP-Scotty
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Climate Change Evidence view your location on the map

explore the signs of global warming on this map or Google Earth. The evidence of climate change includes heat waves, sea-level rise, flooding, melting glaciers, earlier spring arrival, coral reef bleaching, and the spread of disease.

The greatest concentration of global warming indicators on the map is in North America and Europe because that is where most scientific investigation has been done to date. As scientists focus increasingly on fingerprints of global warming in other regions—from Russia to Antarctica and Oceania to South America—the evidence they find will be added to the map.

Scientists project that unless emissions of heat-trapping gases are brought undercontrol, the impacts of climate change are likely to increase

check out the Interactive Map: http://www.climatehotmap.org/ or http://www.google.com/earth/download/ge/agree.html

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*Scott's Contracting*

Green Me UP-Scotty
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Bad combination: Floodplains, nuclear materials and understated risk

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By Bob Criss, special to the Beacon
Posted 7:00 am Fri., 6.17.11
It's only June but one thing is certain: 2011 is another extraordinary flood year. The record high water levels just experienced on the Mississippi from Cairo to Baton Rouge will soon be joined by new record levels on the Missouri River at numerous sites above Kansas City. The vagaries of rainfall delivery will dictate how bad things will become and how far downstream serious problems will propagate, but indications are that many dozens of levees will fail, either by overtopping, under-seepage or simply because they will be water saturated for long periods of time. How is it that this extraordinary flood year came so soon after the extraordinary flood year of 2008, which came so soon after the extraordinary flood years of 2001, 1995 and 1993? The explanation is that damaging episodes of high water are no longer statistically extraordinary, but rather represent the new norm. Describing these events as "50-year," "100-year" or "500-year" floods grossly mischaracterizes what's happening. Understated flood risk is not an academic matter. Faulty risk calculations are used by FEMA to set flood insurance rates that are too low and to define flood zones that are too narrow. Understated risk promotes development projects that place property and lives in hazardous areas. Ironically these same developments encroach on rivers and floodplains in a way that amplifies flood frequency and increases floodwater levels. At the same time, valuable farmland is destroyed, habitat is eliminated and surface water and ground water resources are degraded. In cases where floodplain development projects are encouraged by TIFs and other inappropriate financial inducements, tax revenues can actually go down, even as municipal responsibilities to provide services such as police and fire protection go up. Photo by Bob Criss The West Lake landfill Counterproductive enough? Not for some. Now combine the high and progressively increasing likelihood of flooding with the placement of nuclear materials in floodplains. Let's examine two examples. Incredibly, large volumes of the oldest radioactive waste materials of the Atomic Age were dumped at West Lake landfill in Bridgeton in 1973. From every conceivable viewpoint, the situation is deplorable. Radwaste does not belong in the most populous county in Missouri, near the Missouri River, upstream of several water intakes and within 1.5 miles of Interstates 70 and 270. This site has high risk factors for flooding and is underlain by soils that have high potential to undergo liquefaction during seismic shaking. USGS maps indicate that the potential for strong shaking is significant in this area, so the possibility for slumping of the landfill or the protective levee is significant, particularly during flood years when shallow sediments become saturated. Moreover, the landfill does not have a clay liner or any other protective barrier, nor does it have the leachate collection and drainage systems that are standard in modern landfills. The landfill is not capped, so wind erosion and rainwater penetration can disseminate radwaste. Historical slumping of the landfill has already spread radwaste over adjacent fields. The waste has not been adequately characterized, but enough is known to establish that its level of radioactivity will increase approximately tenfold over time.  This can occur because the systematic decay of the radionuclides produces several additional short-lived "daughter" radioisotopes that will cause the radioactivity of this waste to grow for thousands of years. Few things are as absurd as burying such waste in a substandard landfill in a floodplain in a populous area. As another example, two nuclear power plants in Nebraska have been constructed in the Missouri River floodplain where new records for flood levels are expected to be set this June. The Fort Calhoun Nuclear Plant has been recently sandbagged, only a year after the plant was cited for having inadequate flood protection. Floodwaters are already adjacent to several of the buildings, and water levels are projected to increase by at least five feet. Fortunately, the reactor was recently shut down for refueling, but about 300 tons of spent fuel rods have accumulated onsite over the years. Make no mistake; some of the most serious, recent problems and explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant involved spent fuel, not just the active reactors. Of course, the NRC and power industry promoters routinely assure us that the risk of nuclear accidents is incredibly low, something akin to the probability of being attacked by a shark while riding a ski lift. The historical record provides a more realistic and vastly higher assessment of nuclear risk. More than 2 percent of the world's 440 nuclear power reactors have been irreparably harmed by nuclear accidents during their operating lifetimes - prominent cases are Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and Fukushima. The bottom line is that understated risk is rampant and the consequences can be economically and environmentally disastrous. Understated risk fosters inappropriate land use in high-risk geologic areas, causing harm that can spread far beyond the boundaries of the offending properties. In contrast, realistic risk calculations and improved economic assessment of construction projects will promote wise land use and resource conservation, while reducing the economic burden caused by flooding or other disasters. Thoughtful stewardship will increase opportunities for research, innovation, enterprise and job creation, and ensure a brighter and more equitable future for all. Bob Criss is a professor in the department of Earth and Planetary Sciences at Washington University. He is the coauthor of the 2003 book, "At the Confluence: Rivers, Floods, and Water Quality in the St. Louis Region." To reach Voices authors, contact Beacon features and commentary editor Donna Korando.